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and the extent of overvaluation are signiﬁcantly negatively related to post-IPO
long-run stock performance, overvaluation can predict post-IPO performance
better than the value of the initial return. Value uncertainty in IPOs is positively
related to both underpricing and overvaluation, and both the underwriter’s rep-
utation and the existence of pricing regulation are positively related to underpric-
ing. Investor sentiment has a positive eﬀect on overvaluation but has no eﬀect or a
negative eﬀect on underpricing. Overall, our results suggest that in China over-
valuation accounts for a larger proportion of the initial return than underpricing,
and that underpricing and overvaluation have diﬀerent determinants.
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stock price of PetroChina gradually dropped after its IPO, depreciating by 76% over the next three years. Con-
sequently, countless holders of A-shares in PetroChina lost a great deal of money. However, in China’s IPO
market, stories like that of PetroChina are common. While IPO initial returns are extremely high, the post-
IPO stock performance of many companies is very poor. In theory, there are only two cases in which IPOs
would experience an abnormally high initial return: the oﬀer price of the IPO is too low, indicating that there
is underpricing in the primary market, or the ﬁrst-day closing price is too high, indicating that there is over-
valuation in the secondary market (Han and Wu, 2007).
Therefore, a crucial question is which of these two cases is relatively more important in explaining the phe-
nomena of extremely high initial returns in China: underpricing in the primary market or overvaluation in the
secondary market? We believe that the answer to this question is not only vital to studies of IPO pricing but
also has important implications for the regulators who must decide whether and how to reform IPO pricing in
China. Unfortunately, when discussing initial returns in China, the media seldom distinguish between IPO ini-
tial returns and underpricing. Moreover, the literature usually measures IPO underpricing with IPO initial
returns and does not diﬀerentiate between the extent of underpricing and the extent of overvaluation (e.g.,
Wang et al., 2009; Zhang and Liao, 2011).
However in the Chinese stock market, ﬁrst-day closing prices are often signiﬁcantly overpriced and thus the
initial return and the underpricing are two totally diﬀerent concepts. If the extent of underpricing and over-
valuation is not separated from the value of the initial return, we not only cannot evaluate the relative impor-
tance of these two parts, but also cannot precisely examine the main determinants of underpricing and
overvaluation.
Motivated by this problem and gap in the literature, this paper clariﬁes the two concepts of IPO initial
return and IPO underpricing, separates IPO underpricing and IPO overvaluation from the value of the initial
return, investigates the relative importance of these two parts, and then examines their main determinants.
Estimating IPO ﬁrms’ intrinsic values is the key to measuring the extent of underpricing and overvaluation.
Two methods for assessing intrinsic value are used and compared in this paper: analyst forecasts and compar-
isons to similar ﬁrms (we explain these two methods in detail in Section 4).
Using data from the IPOs of 948 Chinese ﬁrms between 2006 and 2011, our results show that, during the
sample period, when a ﬁrm’s intrinsic value is measured by analyst forecasts, underpricing is about 22.2% and
overvaluation is about 44.1% (twice as much as underpricing). However, when intrinsic value is assessed
through comparable ﬁrms, underpricing is about 13.6% and overpricing is about 52.7% (three times as much
as underpricing). These results consistently show that overvaluation accounts for the largest proportion of the
value of the IPO initial return, suggesting that the ﬁrst-day closing price being overvalued by investors is more
important in explaining the high initial return of Chinese IPOs than the oﬀer price being underpriced by the
issuer.
In addition, both the value of the initial return and the extent of overvaluation are found to be
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with post-IPO long-run stock performance. According to the regression
coeﬃcients of the initial return and the overvaluation, the extent of overvaluation, as measured by analyst
forecasts, predicts post-IPO long-run stock performance better than the value of the initial return, suggest-
ing that extracting the overvaluation from the initial return has value in terms of forecasting post-IPO stock
performance. Additionally, the overvaluation measured by analyst forecasts predicts post-IPO long-run
stock performance better than the overvaluation measured by comparison to similar ﬁrms, suggesting that
analyst forecasts are a more accurate way to measure the extent of overvaluation than using comparable
ﬁrms.
We also ﬁnd that the value uncertainty of IPOs is positively related to both underpricing and overvaluation.
Both underwriter reputation and pricing regulation are positively related to underpricing. Investor sentiment
has a positive eﬀect on overvaluation but has no eﬀect or a negative eﬀect on underpricing. Overall, our results
suggest that overvaluation accounts for the largest proportion of the value of initial returns in China, and that
underpricing and overvaluation have diﬀerent determinants.
These ﬁndings contribute to the literature in two ways. First, while prior studies imply that IPO
initial returns consist of two parts, underpricing and overvaluation (e.g., Cao and Dong, 2006; Han and
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parts. This paper shows that overvaluation accounts for the majority of an IPO’s initial return. This ﬁnding
contributes to studies of IPO pricing by pointing out which parts of the initial return deserve more attention. It
also has implications for regulators who need to consider how to reform IPO pricing structures, by showing
that it is more important to control ﬁrst-day overvaluation than to reduce primary market underpricing.
Moreover, decomposing the initial return can also help to evaluate more comprehensively the potential eﬀects
of IPO pricing reform.
A second way that this paper contributes to the literature is that we split the initial return into underpricing
and overvaluation, and investigate the main determinants of these aspects separately, which can help us
further understand the determinants of the value of IPO initial returns and provides a reference for further
studies that examine the determinants of these two aspects.
This paper is divided into ﬁve sections. In Section 2, we introduce the institutional background of China’s
IPO market. Section 3 provides a theoretical analysis. Section 4 presents our methodology. Section 5 reports
our empirical results and Section 6 concludes the paper.2. Institutional background
During the process of an IPO, the behavior of listed companies, underwriters and investors are inﬂuenced
by both the institutional environment and institutional arrangements. Therefore, before we analyze the com-
position of IPO initial returns and their determinants in China, it is necessary to brieﬂy introduce the institu-
tional environment and institutional arrangements in China’s IPO market.
2.1. IPO institutional environment
IPO initial returns can be explained by both rational and non-rational theories. Given that the market eﬃ-
ciency in China is relative low and the primary market is not a competitive one, non-rational explanations may
be more appropriate (Han and Wu, 2007). First, the extent of the market eﬃciency of China’s stock market is
lower than that of a developed market. While the eﬃciency of the U.S. stock market has been recognized by
both academics and practitioners, Chinese scholars generally believe that China’s stock market has not yet
reached a level of semi-strong form market eﬃciency. For example, many studies, such as Lu and Zhou
(2007) and Xu et al. (2011) have found evidence against China having semi-strong form market eﬃciency.
China’s stock market is an emerging market with a very short history, characterized by inexperienced investors
and intense speculation. As Su (2008) and Tian (2010) point out, most participants in China’s stock market are
individual investors (retail investors), who prefer speculation rather than value investment. This means that
stock prices in China’s stock market are easily inﬂuenced by investor sentiment.
Second, the primary market in China is not yet competitive. In a competitive primary market, underwriters
have an incentive to underprice oﬀer prices intentionally to avoid the risk of IPO failure. However, there are
very few examples of IPO failures in China because investors in China have a very strong interest in subscribing
to new shares (because of the high initial returns in China).1Due to the low risk of IPO failure, ﬁrms and under-
writers have lower incentives to undervalue oﬀer prices compared to those in a developed market. This means
that rational theories may be relatively less important in explaining the value of initial returns in Chinese IPOs.
2.2. IPO institutional arrangements
In China, the government regulates many diﬀerent aspects of IPOs and thus the evolution of IPO institu-
tional arrangements goes hand in hand with changes in laws and regulations. The regulator controls the IPO
process in two main ways: IPO qualiﬁcations and IPO pricing. In relation to IPO qualiﬁcations, the CRSC1 In June 2011, Baling Technology (002592) was forced to cease its IPO because the number of book building participants (mostly
institutional investors) did not reach the quota of 20. It became the ﬁrst failed IPO in China (Baling Technology IPO later succeeded in
November 2011). The second failed IPO (Longmaster Information & Technology, 300288) did not appear until January 2012. The
company succeeded in holding an IPO in February 2012). The fact that there are very few failed IPO cases suggests that there is a low risk
of IPO failure in China.
Table 1
The evolution of China’s IPO system since 2006.
Time period September 2006–June 2009 June 2009–May 2012 May 2012 onward
Veriﬁcation
system
Approval system and sponsor system Approval system and sponsor system Approval system and sponsor system
IPO pricing
system
Book building approach with
“Window Guidance,” IPO ﬁrm’s PE
multiple should not exceed 30
Book building approach without
“Window Guidance”
Book building approach with
“Window Guidance,” IPO ﬁrm’s PE
Multiple should not exceed 25% of
the average PE of industry peers
Book building
system
(1) Preliminarily Inquiry: institutions
must provide at least 20 valid bidders
(50 if the ﬁrm will issue more than 400
million in shares)
(1) Preliminarily Inquiry: institutions
must provide at least 20 valid bidders
(50 if the ﬁrm will issue more than 400
million in shares)
(1) Preliminarily Inquiry: institutions
must provide at least 20 valid bidders
(50 if the ﬁrm will issue more than 400
million in shares)
(2) All eligible allotment subjects who
have participated in the preliminary
inquiry can subscribe for new shares
oﬀ-line and can change their bidding
price and bidding number in the
subscribing stage
(2) Only eligible allotment subjects
who have participated in the
preliminary inquiry can and must
participate in oﬀ-line subscription;
only valid bidders (with a bidding
price no less than the minimum of the
range of oﬀering prices) can
participate in the subscription
(2) Those who did not participate in
the preliminary inquiry, or did not
provide a valid bid are not eligible to
participate in the accumulated





(1) The amount of the oﬀ-line
allotment should not exceed 20% (or
50% for ﬁrms issuing more than 400
million in shares) of total issued
shares
(1) The amount of the oﬀ-line
allotment should not exceed 20% (or
50% for ﬁrms issuing more than 400
million in shares) of total issued
shares
(1) The amount of the oﬀ-line
allotment should not be less than 50%
of the total issued shares
(2) Strategic investors are locked in
for 12 months, and investors who
obtain shares from oﬀ-line allotments
are locked in for three months
(2) Strategic investors are locked in
for 12 months, and investors who
obtain shares from oﬀ-line allotments
are locked in for three months
(2) Investors who obtain shares from









“The Guidance for the Further
Reform and Improvement of the IPO
System (June 11, 2009)”
“The Guidance for the Further
Deepening of Reform of the IPO
System (April 28, 2012)” and “The
Measures for the Administrations of
Securities Issuance and Underwriting
(May 18, 2012)”
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ance Examination Committee of the CSRC examines whether the applicant meets the regulator’s listing cri-
teria. Complementing the approval system, a sponsor system was adopted in 2004, under which an
underwriter conducts due diligence and veriﬁes the truth, accuracy and completeness of the issuer’s materials.
In relation to the second aspect of IPO pricing, China introduced the book building approach in 2005,
which is the dominant method of issuing in most countries.3 Under the book building approach, the2 The approval system means that when new stocks are issued, the issuer should not only completely disclose ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
information but also meet the regulator’s listing criteria. The Issuance Examination Committee of the CSRC determines whether the
applicant meets the listing criteria. The diﬀerence between an approval system and a registration system is whether the regulator judges the
value of IPO ﬁrms. The sponsor system means that the underwriter and representative of the sponsor is responsible for recommending and
guiding the issuer; conducting due diligence; verifying the truth, accuracy and completeness of the issuer’s materials; and assisting the
issuer in building a strict information disclosure system.
3 The book building approach can be divided into two stages: the preliminary inquiry and the accumulated bidding inquiry. The issuer
and the lead underwriter ﬁrst determine the range of oﬀering prices through a preliminary inquiry and then conﬁrm the oﬀering price
through the accumulated bidding inquiry. Whether an accumulated bidding inquiry is required depends on the ﬁrm’s size and the time of
the IPO. Before 2012, small ﬁrms could choose whether to conduct an accumulated bidding inquiry and this has been voluntary for all
ﬁrms since 2012.
S. Song et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 31–49 35underwriter seeks demand information from institutional investors and determines the oﬀer price with the
issuer according to the demand information received. IPO pricing reform in June 2009 further improved
the book building approach. However, China’s regulator has not yet thoroughly adopted the market-based
IPO pricing approach used in developed markets and still controls IPO pricing through “Window Guidance.”4
Although “Window Guidance” was given up in the IPO reform of June 2009, it was restarted under the IPO
reforms of May 2012. The history of IPO reform in China shows that the CSRC is still hesitant in deciding
whether it is necessary to regulate IPO pricing. Thus research that discusses the pros and cons of IPO pricing
regulation is still highly relevant in a Chinese context.
Table 1 summarizes the history of China’s IPO system since the split share reform in 2006.
3. Theoretical analysis and predictions
3.1. IPO initial returns: underpricing or overvaluation
Many theories have been proposed to explain the puzzle of IPO initial returns. These theories can be cat-
egorized by whether they assume investors are rational or not (Han and Wu, 2007). Although current studies
mainly explain IPO initial returns in the United States using theories based on asymmetric information, Ritter
and Welch (2002) argue that information asymmetry cannot fully explain initial returns in the United States,
which can be as high as 18%, and call for more explanations based on non-rational (or semi-rational) investors
or issuers. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) ﬁnd that the median IPO oﬀer price is overvalued by
14–50% relative to industry peers, depending on the peer-matching criteria, which suggests that initial returns
may be a result of optimistic investor sentiment. Other studies such as those of Ljungqvist et al. (2006), Der-
rien (2005) and Dorn (2009) show that an overvalued ﬁrst day closing price is a result of irrational investor
sentiment.
In China, some studies use information asymmetry theory to explain initial returns (e.g., Guo and Zhao,
2006; Wang et al., 2009; Zhang and Liao, 2011), while others use investor sentiment theory to explain initial
returns (e.g., Cao and Dong, 2006; Jiang, 2007; Han and Wu, 2007). We believe that extremely high initial
returns in China (up to 66.3% in the period from 2006 to 2011) are unlikely to be able to be explained under
the assumption of rational investors. In China, the real question is perhaps not whether the ﬁrst-day closing
price of IPOs is overvalued or not, but the extent of this overvaluation. The extent of the overvaluation is an
unanswered question that must be answered with empirical evidence.
Studies have shown that the ﬁrst-day closing price of IPOs usually reverses after the IPO, which raises the
question of post-IPO long-run underperformance (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Jiang, 2007). This question is
related to whether the high initial returns of IPOs are due to underpricing or overvaluation. If the initial return
mainly results from underpricing, then it would be expected that initial returns would either not be related or
positively related to post-IPO long-run performance. Intuitively, IPO underpricing should not be related to
the long-run aftermarket performance. However, signaling theory in ﬁnance suggests that IPO underpricing
is positively related to post-IPO long-run performance. According to the signaling model, high-quality IPO
ﬁrms are more likely to set a lower oﬀer price in an IPO, which deters lower quality ﬁrms from imitating
the ﬁrm and recoups their up-front sacriﬁce post-IPO through future issuing activity (Welch, 1989; Grinblatt
and Hwang, 1989). The signaling model has received some support from empirical evidence (e.g., Su and
Fleisher, 1999). However, if initial returns are mainly a result of the overvaluation of the ﬁrst-day closing
price, we would expect the initial returns to be negatively related to post-IPO long-run performance because
the overpriced ﬁrst-day closing price will be corrected gradually by the secondary market.
In sum, according to this argument, if we split the initial return into underpricing and overvaluation, we
predict that underpricing will not be related to or will be positively related to post-IPO long-run performance,
and that overvaluation will be negatively related to post-IPO long-run performance.4 “Window Guidance” is a kind of regulation with Chinese characteristics. According to “The Measures for the Administrations of
Securities Issuance and Underwriting (September 19, 2006),” the PE multiple used to determine the oﬀering price, generally, cannot exceed
30. In China, the regulator’s “Window Guidance” can substantially reduce the oﬀering price.
36 S. Song et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 31–493.2. Determinants of underpricing and overvaluation
In a developed market, the main participants in an IPO are the issuer, the underwriter and the investors.
What is special in China is that the regulator is also an important participant in IPOs. Under the book build-
ing approach, the issuer and the underwriter negotiate over the result of the preliminary inquiry and determine
the oﬀer price, but the regulator can cap the maximum PE multiple of the oﬀer price. We expect that, in China,
a ﬁrm’s IPO oﬀer price will be mainly determined by the characteristics of the issuer and the underwriter, and
whether there is IPO pricing regulation. Additionally, the ﬁrst-day closing price will be mainly inﬂuenced by
investor sentiment, and the characteristics of IPO ﬁrms may inﬂuence the eﬀects of investor sentiment on the
ﬁrst-day closing price. Thus, we expect a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-day closing price to be mainly aﬀected by investor senti-
ment and the issuing ﬁrm’s characteristics. Due to space limitations, we only consider the most important
characteristics of the issuer and the underwriter, namely, the value uncertainty of IPOs and the underwriter’s
reputation.
3.2.1. The value uncertainty of IPOs
The value uncertainty of IPOs contributes to underpricing because there is asymmetric information
between the issuer and the investors in that the true value of the IPO ﬁrm is known by the issuer but not
by the investors. Therefore, investors require a lower oﬀer price to compensate for their information uncer-
tainty risk and the issuer needs to set a lower oﬀer price to attract these uninformed investors (Beatty and
Ritter, 1986). According to this argument, we predict that a higher value uncertainty of IPOs will be associated
with greater IPO underpricing.
The value uncertainty of IPOs can also aﬀect overvaluation. Existing studies suggest that the stock prices of
ﬁrms with a higher value uncertainty are more likely to be aﬀected by investor sentiment and speculative
behavior (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2007). According to Miller (1977), under the assumption of a short-sale
constraint and heterogeneous expectations, stock prices only reﬂect the most optimistic investors’ expecta-
tions. Given that a higher value uncertainty is often related to higher heterogeneous expectations, the stock
prices of ﬁrms with a higher value uncertainty are more susceptible to optimistic investor sentiment. Addition-
ally, higher value uncertainty is also related to speculative behavior, and thus can lead to the overvaluation of
stock prices. Given that investor sentiment and speculative behavior are common in China’s stock market, we
predict that a higher value uncertainty for IPO ﬁrms is positively related to the overpricing of the ﬁrst-day
closing price.
3.2.2. The underwriter’s reputation
To reduce the risk of value uncertainty facing outside investors, the issuer can signal its fundamental value
in many ways, including by increasing the retained proportion of outstanding shares (Brealey et al., 1977) and
employing a reputed underwriter (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Researchers in China have found evidence that the
reputation of the auditor and venture capital companies have an eﬀect on the extent of IPO underpricing
(Wang et al., 2009; Zhang and Liao, 2011), but these studies fail to ﬁnd evidence that the underwriter’s rep-
utation aﬀects underpricing (Guo and Zhao, 2006; Song et al., 2011).
Theoretically, the reputation of the underwriter could either increase or decrease the extent of underpricing.
On the one hand, according to the signaling hypothesis, underwriters with a higher reputation could send a
positive signal to outside investors and mitigate the value uncertainty of IPOs, thus reducing underpricing
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986). On the other hand, according to the conﬂict of interest hypothesis, there is a conﬂict
of interest between the underwriter and the issuer. Underwriters have an incentive to set a lower oﬀer price to
reduce the risk of IPO failure and to cater to their customers (institutional investors) (Beatty and Welch, 1996;
Guo and Zhao, 2006). Compared with underwriters with a low reputation, those with high reputations have
stronger bargaining power in setting the oﬀer price and are thus more capable of increasing IPO underpricing.
Furthermore, compared with large ﬁrms, small ﬁrms have weaker bargaining power in setting the oﬀer price
and thus their shares are more likely to be underpriced by their underwriters. According to this analysis, we
therefore do not have a clear prediction of the direction of the eﬀect of an underwriter’s reputation on the
extent of underpricing.
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As mentioned in the institutional background section, during some periods in our sample, the regulator
stipulated that the oﬀer prices of IPO ﬁrms were not allowed to exceed a certain PE multiple (for example,
30). In this situation, IPO pricing regulation would have decreased the oﬀer price and thus increased IPO
underpricing. Liu et al. (2011) have shown that deregulating IPO pricing indeed reduces the level of underpric-
ing (as measured by IPO initial returns). We therefore predict that IPO pricing regulation is positively related
to underpricing.
3.2.4. Investor sentiment
Investor sentiment aﬀects underpricing. The puzzle of the hot market is well documented in academia. The
initial returns and issue volume of IPOs ﬂuctuate periodically. The initial returns of IPOs during some periods
are much higher than the average level and there are more ﬁrms going public in some periods than in others
(e.g., Ritter, 1984). The puzzle of the hot market suggests that IPO ﬁrms take advantage of investors’ optimis-
tic sentiment. Under the charge mode of underwriting in China,5 we believe that underwriters have an incen-
tive to exploit the optimistic sentiment of investors to increase an IPO ﬁrm’s oﬀer price, thus increasing their
underwriting fee. Therefore, we predict that there will be a negative relationship between investor sentiment
and underpricing.
Investor sentiment also aﬀects overvaluation. According to the hypothesis of heterogeneous expectations
proposed by Miller (1977), in a market without short-selling, when investors have divergent opinions about
a ﬁrm’s fundamental value, the stock price of this stock will only reﬂect the expectations of the most optimistic
investors, leading to an overvalued stock price. Past studies, such as those by Ritter and Welch (2002) and
Ljungqvist et al. (2006), have shown that investor sentiment can explain the high initial returns of IPOs in
the United States. In China, short-selling is not available, and there is often a very high divergence of opinions
among investors (as shown by the high turnover in the ﬁrst-day trading of IPOs). So the closing prices of Chi-
nese IPO ﬁrms are very likely to be subject to optimistic investor sentiment. Studies from China, such as Jiang
(2007) and Han and Wu (2007), have also found evidence that investor sentiment is related to the overvalu-
ation of ﬁrst-day closing prices. We thus predict that investor sentiment will be positively related to overvalu-
ation. Additionally, according to the previous analysis, we predict that the higher the value uncertainty of
IPOs, the larger the eﬀect of investor sentiment on the overvaluation.
Overall, we predict that the value uncertainty of IPOs will be positively related to both underpricing and
overvaluation, the underwriter’s reputation will be either be positively or negatively related to underpricing,
IPO pricing regulation will have a positive inﬂuence on underpricing, investor sentiment will be positively
related to overvaluation, and the value uncertainty of IPOs and investor sentiment will have an interactive
eﬀect on overvaluation. Table 2 summarizes these predictions.
4. Sample and methodology
4.1. Sample and data sources
To test our predictions, we initially collected data from the IPOs of 994 ﬁrms for the period from September
19, 2006 to December 31, 2011. We selected September 19, 2006 as the start time because this was the date
when the CSRC enacted the “Measures for the Administrations of Securities Issuance and Underwriting.”
It was also at this time that the split share reform ended. By selecting IPOs that occurred after the new reg-
ulations were enacted in September 2006, we avoid potential discrepancies in the data caused by changes to
regulations and institutions. Our sample period ends on December 31, 2011 because we want to ensure that
there was at least one year of post-IPO stock performance data for each examined ﬁrm. Based on the initial
sample, we exclude ﬁrms without suﬃcient data on analyst forecasts, stock prices and other ﬁrm characteris-
tics, which left a sample of 948 IPO ﬁrms. The process of sample selection is reported in Table 3.5 It is reported that underwriters generally charge underwriting by segment. Within the range of the issuer’s expected ﬁnancing amount,
the underwriter can usually obtain an underwriting fee of about 3% (which is rather low) but for the part exceeding the expected amount of
ﬁnancing the underwriting can charge as much as 10%.
Table 2







IPO underpricing Positive Positive/negative Positive Negative
IPO overvaluation Positive, interactive
with investor sentiment




Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Initial sample 65 125 76 99 347 282 994
(Exclude: observations without suﬃcient data) (5) (16) (3) (4) (11) (7) (46)
Final sample 60 109 73 95 336 275 948
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ing Research) databases, and all other data, including IPO initial returns, post-IPO stock performance and
ﬁrm characteristics, were obtained from the CSMAR database. It is important to note that WIND collects
analyst forecasts from many securities companies but not all of them, so we collected additional data on ana-
lyst forecasts from CSMAR to complement the omission of some of these forecasts in the WIND database.4.2. Model construction and variable deﬁnitions
4.2.1. Model construction
We use the following models to examine the eﬀects of IPO initial returns, IPO underpricing and IPO over-
valuation on post-IPO long-run stock performance:BHAR ¼ aþ b1  IRþ b2  Underwriter þ b3  Toponeþ b4  EPS þ b5  Ageþ b6  Size
þ I :Board þ I :Induþ I :Year þþe ð1Þ
BHAR ¼ aþ b1  IRUP þ b2  IROP þ b3  Underwriter þ b4  Toponeþ b5  EPS þ b6  Age
þ b7  Sizeþ I :Board þ I :Induþ I :Year þþe ð2ÞIn Model 1, the dependent variable is BHAR (Buy and Hold Abnormal Return), which represents the post-
IPO long-run stock performance. This can be expressed as BHAR240, BHAR480 and BHAR720, representing
the one-year, two-year, and three-year post-IPO BHAR, respectively. The main independent variable is IR,
which is a proxy for IPO initial returns. In addition, drawing on the literature (e.g., Zhang and Liao, 2011;
Song et al., 2011), we include Underwriter (underwriter reputation), Topone (shareholding proportion of
the largest shareholder), EPS (earnings per share), Age (ﬁrm age), Size (ﬁrm size), I.Board (dummy variables
for listing board eﬀects), I.Year (dummy variables for year eﬀects) and I.Indu (dummy variables for industry
eﬀects) as control variables in our model. Based on our theoretical analysis, we predict that IR is negatively
related to BHAR. The variables used in Model 1 are deﬁned in detail in Table 4.
In Model 2, the main independent variables are IRUP (IPO underpricing) and IROP (IPO overvaluation),
instead of IR. The control variables are the same as those in Model 1. According to our theoretical analysis,
we predict that IROP will have a negative relationship with BHAR, and that IRUP will not be related to or
will be positively related to BHAR.
We use the following model to investigate the determinants of IPO initial returns, IPO underpricing and
IPO overvaluation:IR n IRUP n IROP ¼ aþ b1  Uncer þ b2  Underwriter þ b3  PEcontrolþ b4  Sent þ b5
 Toponeþ b6  EPS þ b7  Ageþ b8  Sizeþ I :Board þ I :Induþ I :Year þ e ð3Þ
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(IPO overvaluation). Based on our theoretical analysis, we include the following four variables as the main
independent variables: Uncer (value uncertainty of the IPO), Underwriter (underwriter reputation), PEcontrol
(whether IPO pricing is regulated) and Sent (investor sentiment). Referring to the literature, such as Zhang
and Liao (2011) and Song et al. (2011), we control for the following variables in Model 3: Topone (sharehold-
ing proportion of the largest shareholder), EPS (earnings per share), Age (ﬁrm age), Size (ﬁrm size), I.Board
(dummy variables for listing board eﬀects), I.Year (dummy variables for year eﬀects) and I.Indu (dummy vari-
ables for industry eﬀects). We predict that Uncer, Sent and PEcontrol are positively related to IR; that Uncer
and PEcontrol are positively related to IRUP; that Uncer and Sent are positively related to IROP; and that
Underwriter is either positively or negatively related to IRUP.4.2.2. Variable deﬁnitions
4.2.2.1. IPO underpricing and IPO overvaluation. Estimating an IPO ﬁrm’s intrinsic value (or fundamental
value) is the key to measuring IPO underpricing and overvaluation. Two methods for estimating intrinsic
value are used and compared in our study: the method of analyst forecasts and the method of comparison
to similar ﬁrms.
4.2.2.1.1. The method of analyst forecasts. Taking advantage of unique data from analyst forecasts, we mea-
sure the intrinsic value of IPO ﬁrms based on analyst forecast prices.6 We ﬁrst compute the mean of each ana-
lyst’s forecast prices (analysts usually forecast a range of intrinsic values for each IPO ﬁrm), and then calculate
the mean of all analyst forecast prices that were released before the IPO.7 We exclude observations in which
forecast prices are provided by analysts aﬃliated to the underwriters and observations that are not the ana-
lyst’s last forecast price released before the IPO.8 In our dataset, 92% of IPO ﬁrms have at least three analysts
providing forecast prices and 74% of IPO ﬁrms have at least ﬁve analysts providing forecast prices. Given this
large number of analyst forecasts, we can avoid the subjectivity and randomness that would result if forecast
prices from a single analyst were used.
4.2.2.1.2. The method of comparable ﬁrms. Following Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), we use the
product of the IPO ﬁrm’s industry peers’ PEs and the IPO ﬁrm’s EPS to measure the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value. For
each IPO in our sample, we ﬁnd a non-IPO industry peer with comparable sales and net income that did not
go public in the previous three years. Speciﬁcally, we select comparable ﬁrms using three steps: (1) to obtain
appropriate comparable ﬁrms, we ﬁrst consider all ﬁrms in the CSMAR database for the ﬁscal year before the
IPO and then exclude ﬁrms with negative PE ratios or with PE ratios exceeding 1009 and ﬁrms that went pub-
lic in the previous three years; (2) we group ﬁrms in each industry into 4 (2  2) portfolios based on sales and
net income, and also group the IPO ﬁrms (our sample ﬁrms) into 4 (2  2) portfolios in the same way; (3) each
IPO ﬁrm is then matched to the appropriate industry-sales-income bracket. Using this portfolio, we select a
comparable ﬁrm that is closest in sales size to the IPO ﬁrm.
We believe that compared with this method of selecting comparable ﬁrms, using analyst forecasts may have
some advantages in predicting an IPO ﬁrm’s intrinsic value. First, given that analysts are experts in their
industry, they may be able to choose more appropriate comparable ﬁrms (most of the analysts use comparable
ﬁrms’ PEs to estimate an IPO ﬁrm’s PE). Additionally, analysts generally adjust the estimated PE of IPO ﬁrms
according to ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, such as the extent of industry competition and growth potential, so
their estimation of an IPO ﬁrm’s PE ratio may more accurate.
4.2.2.2. Post-IPO long-run stock performance
.6 By reading the abstracts of analyst reports, we ﬁnd that analysts forecast the intrinsic value (reasonable price) of an IPO ﬁrm rather
than the ﬁrst-day closing price. Therefore, it makes sense to use analyst forecast prices to measure intrinsic value.
7 For instance, an IPO ﬁrm receives a price forecast from three analysts, and their forecast prices are 11–13, 12–14 and 13–15,
respectively. The mean forecast prices for each analyst are 12 ((11 + 13)/2), 13 and 14 respectively, and the overall mean forecast price is 13
((12 + 13 + 14/3)). We would then use this mean forecast price (13) to measure the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm.
8 During the entire process of sample selection, we obtained 11,471 analyst forecasts. After deleting 136 forecasts from analysts who were
aﬃliated with underwriters and 532 repeated forecasts, we had a ﬁnal total of 10,957 analyst forecasts for all of the sample ﬁrms.
9 Generally, ﬁrms with a PE of more than 100 are rare and are thus not suitable as matching ﬁrms.
Table 4
Deﬁnition of variables.
Variable name Deﬁnition of variables
Dependent variables
IR IPO initial return = (ﬁrst-day closing price  oﬀer price)/oﬀer price
IRUP1 IPO underpricing = (intrinsic value  oﬀer price)/oﬀer price; intrinsic value = the mean of analyst forecast prices
IROP1 IPO overvaluation = (ﬁrst-day closing price  intrinsic value)/oﬀer price; intrinsic value = the mean of analyst forecast
prices
IRUP2 IPO underpricing = (intrinsic value  oﬀer price)/oﬀer price; intrinsic value = the comparable ﬁrm’s PE  the IPO
ﬁrm’s EPS
IROP2 IPO overvaluation = (ﬁrst-day closing price  intrinsic value)/oﬀer price; intrinsic value = the comparable ﬁrm’s
PE  the IPO ﬁrm’s EPS
BHAR240 Post-IPO long-run stock performance = the 240-day (approximately one year) buy and hold abnormal return following
the IPO
BHAR480 Post-IPO long-run stock performance = the 480 days (approximately two years) buy and hold abnormal return
following the IPO
BHAR720 Post-IPO long-run stock performance = the 720 days (approximately three years) buy and hold abnormal return
following the IPO
Independent variables
Uncer Value Uncertainty for the IPO as measured by the divergence of analyst forecast prices (variance of analyst forecast
prices/mean of analyst forecast prices)
PEcontrol Whether the CSRC regulated IPO pricing (dummy variable) at the time of the IPO, 1 for yes and 0 for no; during our
sample period from 2006 to 2011, oﬀer prices were regulated by the CSRC before June 2009
Sent Index of investor sentiment, computed using principle component analysis of four sentiment related variables
Underwriter Underwriter reputation, equal to 1 for the top 10 underwriters, and 0 otherwise
Topone Shareholding proportion of the largest shareholder
EPS Earnings per share = net income/total equity
Age Firm age = the year of IPO  the year of ﬁrm establishment
Size Natural logarithm of issuance size = Ln(number of issued shares  oﬀer price)
I.Board Dummy variables for listing board eﬀects. We have the main board, SME board and GEM board, and thus create two
dummy variables to control for board eﬀects
I.Indu Dummy variables for industry eﬀects. We have 13 industries, according to the classiﬁcation of industries by the CSRC,
and thus create 12 dummy variables to control for industry eﬀects
I.Year Dummy variables for year eﬀects. We have six years in our sample period and thus create ﬁve dummy variables to
control for year eﬀects
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ð1þ RmtÞPost-IPO long-run stock performance is measured by BHAR. In the above formula, BHAR (2, n) is the buy
and hold abnormal return of IPO ﬁrms from the second day to the nth day after the IPO (this does not include
the ﬁrst day of the IPO); Rmt is the market return for day t, where t belongs to the range from 2 to n. Accord-
ing to the requirements of diﬀerent stock performance periods, we set n to be equal to 240 days, 480 days and
720 days, which results in measurements for BHAR240, BHAR480 and BHAR720, as reported in Table 4.10
4.2.2.3. Investor sentiment. There is no standard way in academia to measure investor sentiment, and scholars
usually use principle component analysis to integrate several variables into a comprehensive factor for investor
sentiment. In the spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2007) and Wu et al. (2012), we use the following four variables
to create an overall investor sentiment index: (1) market turnover (monthly data); (2) discounts of closed-end
funds (monthly data); (3) the number of shareholders that open new stock accounts (monthly data); (4) and
the three-month stock return of the Shanghai Composite Index.
4.2.2.4. Value uncertainty and underwriter reputation. In previous studies, the divergence of analyst earnings
forecasts is often used to measure a ﬁrm’s information uncertainty (e.g., Barron et al., 1998; Zhang, 2006).ause of the limitations of the dataset, the number of observations for BHAR720 and BHAR480 is smaller than for BHAR240 and
hen we use BHAR720 and BHAR480 as dependent variables the sample is smaller than when the full sample is used.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics.
N Mean p50 Max. Min. SD
IR 948 0.663 0.405 5.381 0.232 0.806
IRUP1 948 0.222 0.122 2.663 0.233 0.346
IROP1 948 0.441 0.311 4.668 0.517 0.600
IRUP2 948 0.136 0.031 3.147 0.778 0.597
IROP2 948 0.527 0.448 4.403 2.542 0.663
BHAR240 948 0.144 0.142 4.041 3.216 0.533
BHAR480 782 0.073 0.177 3.975 2.979 0.520
BHAR720 439 0.041 0.079 5.984 5.389 0.861
Uncer 948 0.167 0.160 0.572 0.025 0.068
PEcontrol 948 0.745 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.436
Sent 948 0.143 0.230 1.939 1.093 0.412
Underwriter 948 0.399 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.490
Topone 948 0.391 0.382 0.865 0.052 0.151
EPS 948 0.554 0.498 3.158 0.058 0.301
Age 948 1.715 1.946 3.258 0.000 0.777
Size 948 11.115 11.035 15.715 9.110 0.878
Note: The variables are deﬁned in Table 4.
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the reputation of the underwriter will also be associated with their underwriting income (e.g., Megginson and
Weiss, 1991; Liu et al., 2011), thus we use the rank of underwriting income to measure underwriter reputation
and create a variable that equals 1 if the underwriter is in the top 10, and 0 otherwise.114.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The results in Table 5 show that (1) during
our sample period (2006–2011), the mean IPO initial returns in China were 66.3%; (2) when intrinsic value was
measured using analyst forecast prices, the mean IPO underpricing and overvaluation were 22.2% and 44.1%,
respectively, but when the intrinsic value was measured using a comparable ﬁrm’s PE and the IPO ﬁrm’s EPS,
the mean underpricing and overvaluation were 13.6% and 52.7%, respectively; (3) compared with those esti-
mated using analyst forecasts, the underpricing and overvaluation estimated using comparable ﬁrms have lar-
ger minimums, maximums and standard errors, suggesting that using analyst forecasts is a more precise way
to predict intrinsic value (because it is less likely to produce extreme values); (4) the mean BHAR 240 days,
480 days and 720 days after the IPO were 14.4%, 7.3% and 4.1%, respectively, and the medians were
14.2%, 17.7% and 7.9%, respectively, suggesting that more than half of IPO ﬁrms underperform the mar-
ket and conﬁrming that there is a phenomenon of post-IPO long-run underperformance in China.
Table 6 reports the correlation analysis of the main variables. The results in Table 6 show that (1) the
correlation coeﬃcient between IR (IPO initial returns) and IROP (IPO overvaluation) is larger than the
coeﬃcient between IR and IRUP (IPO underpricing), which indicates that the size of the initial return is more
related to overvaluation than overpricing (we thus conclude that overvaluation accounts for a larger part of
the initial return); (2) IRUP1 and IRUP2, and IROP1 and IROP2 are positively and signiﬁcantly related,
suggesting that the two methods we use to estimate intrinsic value are at least somewhat consistent; (3) IR,
IROP1 and IRUP2 are negatively and signiﬁcantly related to BHAR240 (the one year post-IPO abnormal
return), suggesting that higher initial returns, higher overvaluation (as estimated by analyst forecasts) and
higher underpricing (as estimated using comparable ﬁrms) are associated with poorer post-IPO long-run stock
performance; (4) IR, IRUP1, IRUP2, IROP1 and IROP2 are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with Uncer
(the value uncertainty of the IPO), Sent (investor sentiment) and PEcontrol (whether there is regulation of IPO
pricing); (5) IRUP1 is positively and signiﬁcantly related to Underwriter (underwriter reputation); (6) and11 Using the top 10 as the cut-oﬀ point is common in the literature. Our empirical results are not aﬀected if the top eight is used as the
cut-oﬀ instead of the top 10.
Table 6
Correlation analysis.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. IR 1.000
2. IRUP1 0.734* 1.000
3. IROP1 0.920* 0.410* 1.000
4. IRUP2 0.589* 0.645* 0.419* 1.000
5. IROP2 0.686* 0.311* 0.742* 0.185* 1.000
6. BHAR240 0.121* 0.031 0.180* 0.145* 0.017 1.000
7. Uncer 0.332* 0.329* 0.256* 0.193* 0.230* 0.037 1.000
8. Underwriter 0.044 0.147* 0.026 0.006 0.058 0.108* 0.013 1.000
9. PEcontrol 0.601* 0.688* 0.411* 0.641* 0.154* 0.211* 0.213* 0.081 1.000
10. Sent 0.412* 0.248* 0.410* 0.340* 0.194* 0.275* 0.167* 0.017 0.414* 1.000
11. Topone 0.026 0.058 0.001 0.012 0.021 0.015 0.035 0.045 0.112* 0.066 1.000
12. EPS 0.251* 0.096* 0.282* 0.077 0.236* 0.130* 0.098* 0.029 0.192* 0.175* 0.047 1.000
13. Age 0.152* 0.147* 0.119* 0.087* 0.106* 0.028 0.040 0.009 0.193* 0.017 0.083 0.121* 1.000
14. Size 0.402* 0.309* 0.362* 0.543* 0.001 0.157* 0.138* 0.048 0.298* 0.128* 0.230* 0.255* 0.066 1.000
Note: The variables are deﬁned in Table 4.
* P < 0.01.
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cided with a period of IPO pricing regulation. However, it is important to note that the results from the cor-
relation coeﬃcients only provide preliminary conclusions and further regression analysis based on theory is
needed.5. Empirical results
5.1. IPO initial returns: underpricing or overvaluation
Fig. 1 plots IPO underpricing and overvaluation as measured by analyst forecast prices for the sample ﬁrms
from 2006 to 2011. It shows that, from 2006 to 2011, although the value of initial returns ﬁrst increases and
then decreases substantially, overvaluation consistently accounts for a larger proportion of the initial return
than underpricing. We believe that the huge ﬂuctuation in the value of initial returns is the result of variation
in the ﬁrm characteristics, changes in the IPO pricing regulation and the stock market environment during the
sample period. We thus categorize our sample into groups by listing board, market environment and IPO pric-
ing regulation, and then compare the initial return, underpricing and overvaluation within these diﬀerent
groups. We also compare the diﬀerence between the underpricing and the overvaluation in each group.
Table 7 presents the results based on this group comparison. The results in the ﬁrst row of Table 7 show
that the average initial return was 66% during the sample period. When intrinsic value is measured by
analyst forecasts, underpricing is about 22% and overvaluation is about 44% (twice as large as underpric-
ing). When intrinsic value is measured using comparable ﬁrms, underpricing is about 14% and overvalua-
tion is about 53% (more than three times as large as underpricing). The results for the grouping by listing
board show that, when intrinsic value is measured by analyst forecasts, the initial return, underpricing and
overvaluation in the main board are lower than those in the SME board and GEM board. When intrinsic
value is measured using comparable ﬁrms, underpricing in the main board is lower than in the other boards,
but overvaluation in the main board is almost the same as in the other boards. Third, the results for the
grouping by investor sentiment show that, in periods of high investor investment, the initial return,
underpricing and overvaluation are signiﬁcantly higher than during periods with weak investor sentiment.
The diﬀerence between underpricing and overvaluation is also larger in periods with strong investor
sentiment. Fourth, the results for the grouping by IPO pricing regulation show that, compared with the
period in which the CSRC regulated IPO pricing, the initial return, underpricing and overvaluation are
signiﬁcantly lower in the period when the CSRC deregulated IPO pricing. In summary, the results from
both the full sample and the sub-samples show that overvaluation accounts for a signiﬁcantly larger part
Figure 1. IPO underpricing and IPO overvaluation from 2006 to 2011.
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of initial returns in China.
It is worth mentioning that the IPO ﬁrms’ intrinsic values estimated both by analyst forecasts and using
comparable ﬁrms are likely to be aﬀected by investor sentiment. However, we ﬁnd that overvaluation is sig-
niﬁcant larger than underpricing both in periods of high and low investor sentiment, suggesting that measure-
ment bias resulting from investor sentiment does not aﬀect our conclusion. Furthermore, because China’s
stock market lacks a short-selling mechanism, stock prices are more often overvalued rather than underval-
ued, which leads to the possibility that our methods may overestimate the intrinsic value of IPO ﬁrms. There-
fore, if it were possible to remove this kind of positive deviation in estimating intrinsic value, overvaluation
would be likely to account for an even larger part of the initial return, supporting the conclusion that IPO
overvaluation accounts for a larger part of the IPO initial return than underpricing. Therefore, we can con-
ﬁdently conclude that an overvalued ﬁrst closing price is a much more important issue than the underpricing
of oﬀers in China’s IPO market.
5.2. IPO initial return and post-IPO long-run stock performance
In this subsection, we further investigate the eﬀects of IPO initial returns, underpricing and overvaluation
on the post-IPO long-run stock performance. This subsection has two main purposes: to examine the relation-
ship between these variables and to evaluate and compare the two methods we used to measure underpricing
and overvaluation.
The results in Table 8 show that (1) controlling for other variables, IR (IPO initial return) is signiﬁcantly
negatively related to BHAR (post-IPO long-run stock performance), suggesting that the initial return contains
at least some component of overvaluation; (2) IROP (IPO overvaluation) is signiﬁcantly negatively related to
BHAR, which is consistent with our prediction that the overvalued ﬁrst-day closing price of IPO ﬁrms reverts
to its intrinsic value; (3) when intrinsic value is measured by analyst forecasts, underpricing (IRUP1) is pos-
itively related to post-IPO long-run performance, whereas when intrinsic value is measured using comparable
ﬁrms, underpricing (IRUP2) is negatively related to post-IPO long-run performance. Our theoretical analysis
predicts that underpricing would either not be related to or would be positively related to post-IPO long-run
performance. We thus believe that the method of analyst forecasts measures underpricing and overvaluation
better than the method of using comparable ﬁrms.
We can also compare the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of IR and IROP1, IR and IROP2, IROP1 and IROP2
using the SUEST test. The results in Table 8 show that, no matter whether BHAR240, BHAR480 or
BHAR720 is used as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcients of IROP1 are signiﬁcantly larger in their absolute
value than those of IR and IROP2, and the coeﬃcients of IR and IROP2 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. These
results imply that overvaluation estimated by using analyst forecasts is better at predicting post-IPO long-run
performance than overvaluation estimated using comparable ﬁrms. This result further supports the conclusion
that the method of using analyst forecasts is better at measuring underpricing and overvaluation.
In addition, the results in Table 8 show that the regression coeﬃcients of IR, IROP1 and IROP2 increase as
the timescale of the dependent variables increases from BHAR240 to BHAR480 and BHAR720. This suggests
that the ﬁrst-day closing price of IPO ﬁrms reverts gradually to its intrinsic value. Lastly, the results in Table 8
show that ﬁrm performance (EPS) is positively related to post-IPO long-run stock performance, and ﬁrm size
Table 7
IPO underpricing and overvaluation: group comparison.
N IR IRUP1 IROP1 Diﬀ1sig IRUP2 IROP2 Diﬀ2sig
Full sample (N = 948) 0.66 0.22 0.44 0.22*** 0.14 0.53 0.39***
Group by listing board: 1 for main board, 0 for others
0 (N = 855) 0.68 0.23 0.46 0.23*** 0.15 0.53 0.37***
1 (N = 93) 0.49 0.19 0.30 0.11 0.03 0.52 0.55***
Diﬀ2sig 0.20** 0.04 0.16** 0.19*** 0.01
Group by investor sentiment: 1 for high sentiment, 0 for others
0 (N = 474) 0.49 0.21 0.28 0.08*** 0.09 0.40 0.31***
1 (N = 474) 0.84 0.24 0.60 0.36*** 0.18 0.65 0.47***
Diﬀ2sig 0.35*** 0.03 0.32*** 0.10*** 0.25***
Group by IPO pricing regulation:1 for yes, 0 for others
0 (N = 430) 0.38 0.07 0.31 0.24*** 0.10 0.48 0.58***
1 (N = 242) 1.49 0.63 0.86 0.23*** 0.79 0.70 0.09
Diﬀ2fsig 1.11*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.89*** 0.22***
Note: IR, IRUP and IROP are proxies for the IPO initial return, IPO underpricing and IPO overvaluation, respectively. IRUP1 and
IROP1 are the underpricing and overvaluation as estimated by analyst forecasts. IRUP2 and IROP2 are the underpricing and over-
valuation as estimated from comparable ﬁrms. Diﬀ1 is the diﬀerence of IRUP and IROP within the group and Diﬀ2 is the diﬀerence of
IRUP and IROP between groups.
P < 0.1.
** P < 0.05.
*** P < 0.01.
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and smaller ﬁrms have better post-IPO long-run performance.5.3. Determinants of IPO initial returns, underpricing and overvaluation
The results for the determinants of IPO initial returns, overpricing and overvaluation are presented in
Table 9. In the foregoing subsection, we show that the method of using analyst forecasts is better at measuring
underpricing and overvaluation than that of using comparable ﬁrms. In this subsection, we thus only report
the results for the determinants of underpricing and overvaluation as measured by analyst forecasts.
The results in Column 1 of Table 9 show that after controlling for other factors, the value uncertainty of
IPOs (Uncer), investor sentiment (Sent) and whether IPO pricing is regulated (PEcontrol) are signiﬁcantly pos-
itively related to IPO initial returns (IR). This suggests that ﬁrms with high value uncertainty and ﬁrms with
IPOs in periods of high investor sentiment have higher initial returns. IPO pricing regulation by the CSRC
signiﬁcantly increases initial returns. The results in Column 2 shows that the value uncertainty of IPOs,
whether IPO pricing is regulated, and the underwriter’s reputation (Underwriter) are all signiﬁcantly positively
related to IPO underpricing (IRUP1). The results in Column 3 show that the value uncertainty of IPOs
(Uncer), investor sentiment (Sent) and whether IPO pricing is regulated (PEcontrol) are signiﬁcantly positively
related to IPO overvaluation (IROP1). Additionally, the results in Columns 1 to 3 show that ﬁrm performance
(EPS) is positively related to underpricing but negatively related to overvaluation, and that ﬁrm age (Age) is
signiﬁcantly negatively related to overvaluation but insigniﬁcantly related to underpricing. This suggests that
ﬁrm characteristics may have diﬀerent impacts on underpricing and overvaluation. Given that most of these
results are consistent with our predictions, we do not further elaborate on them in this section.
These results show that Uncer and PEcontrol aﬀect both IPUP1 and IPOP1. We thus further examine the
diﬀerence in the eﬀects of these two variables on IPUP1 and IPOP1. The results in Table 9 show that the coef-
ﬁcients of Uncer do not diﬀer between Column 2 and Column 3 (SUEST test: chi2 (1) = 0.28). However, the
coeﬃcients of PEcontrol diﬀer signiﬁcantly between Column 2 and Column 3 (chi2 (1) = 51.25), suggesting
that whether the CRSC regulates IPO pricing has diﬀerent impacts on underpricing and overvaluation. We
use the sample period adjacent to the IPO pricing regulation (2008 and 2009) to further examine the eﬀects
Table 8
IPO Initial return, IPO underpricing, IPO overvaluation and post-IPO long run stock performance.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BHAR240 BHAR240 BHAR240 BHAR480 BHAR480 BHAR480 BHAR720 BHAR720 BHAR720
IR 0.088*** 0.17*** 0.20***
(2.89) (5.30) (4.12)
IROP1 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.34***
(5.71) (6.27) (4.87)
IRUP1 0.30*** 0.089 0.24**
(4.15) (1.12) (1.97)
IROP2 0.083** 0.16*** 0.18***
(2.58) (5.30) (3.58)
IRUP2 0.12** 0.22*** 0.37***
(2.43) (3.31) (3.38)
Underwriter 0.043 0.030 0.044 0.0013 0.014 0.0018 0.032 0.072 0.033
(1.43) (1.01) (1.44) (0.04) (0.43) (0.06) (0.44) (0.97) (0.46)
Topone 0.039 0.029 0.043 0.062 0.058 0.066 0.049 0.048 0.034
(0.42) (0.32) (0.46) (0.65) (0.62) (0.69) (0.21) (0.20) (0.14)
EPS 0.14** 0.097 0.16** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.65*** 0.61*** 0.73***
(2.07) (1.44) (1.97) (3.15) (2.92) (3.27) (3.29) (3.25) (3.67)
Age 0.0094 0.0072 0.011 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.066 0.067 0.077
(0.61) (0.47) (0.68) (1.11) (1.08) (1.18) (1.26) (1.30) (1.47)
Size 0.033 0.036 0.049 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.39***
(1.20) (1.32) (1.35) (4.76) (5.05) (4.22) (4.69) (4.91) (4.38)
_cons 0.68 0.72* 0.48 1.07*** 1.12*** 1.32*** 3.37*** 3.46*** 4.34***
(1.61) (1.71) (0.90) (2.78) (2.91) (2.74) (3.46) (3.55) (3.43)
I.Board Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
I.Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
I.Indu Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coeﬃcients diﬀerence test
(SUEST test)
IR = IROP1 IROP1 = IROP2 IR = IROP2 IR = IROP1 IROP1 = IROP2 IR = IROP2 IR = IROP1 IROP1 = IROP2 IR = IROP2
(28.39***) (29.03**) (0.39) (10.52***) (12.58***) (0.59) (10.09***) (12.79***) (2.43)
Adj. R2 0.286 0.316 0.286 0.220 0.235 0.220 0.196 0.224 0.204
N 948 948 948 782 782 782 439 439 439
Notes: BHAR (the dependent variable) is a proxy for the post-IPO long run stock performance. IR, IRUP and IROP are proxies for IPO initial returns, IPO underpricing and IPO
overvaluation, respectively. The variables are deﬁned in Table 4. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics.
* P < 0.1.
** P < 0.05.











































46 S. Song et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 31–49of IPO pricing regulations on underpricing and overvaluation. Because the market environment changes
quickly in China, limiting our sample to a narrower window will help us to evaluate more precisely the con-
sequence of the deregulation of IPO pricing. The results in Columns 4 and 5 show that, during the sample
period of 2008–2009 (there are 73 observations before and 95 observations after the regulation), PEcontrol
is signiﬁcantly positively related to IRUP1 but not signiﬁcantly related to IROP1. This indicates that deregu-
lating IPO pricing reduces underpricing but not overvaluation, which is consistent with our predictions.
The results in Column 2 show that the underwriter’s reputation is positively related to underpricing, sup-
porting the conﬂict of interest hypothesis but not the signaling hypothesis. To further provide evidence for the
conﬂict of interest hypothesis, we classify the full sample into two groups by ﬁrm size (issuance size) and ﬁnd
that a positive relationship between the underwriter’s reputation and underpricing only exists in the IPOs of
smaller ﬁrms (these results are reported in Columns 6 and 7). According to our theoretical analysis, these
results are consistent with the conﬂict of interest hypothesis. The results in Columns 6 and 7 also show that
investor sentiment (Sent) is signiﬁcantly negatively related to underpricing in small ﬁrms, suggesting that
underwriters take advantage of investor sentiment toward small ﬁrms to beneﬁt themselves.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that value uncertainty in IPOs and investor sentiment may have an inter-
action eﬀect in overvaluation, but our regressions in Columns 1 to 3 only examine the main eﬀect. In view of
this consideration, we further add an interaction term Uncer  Sent in Columns 8 and 9. The results in Col-
Table 9
Determinants of IPO initial return, IPO underpricing and IPO overvaluation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent
variables
IR IRUP1 IROP1 IRUP1 IROP1 IRUP1 IRUP1 IROP1 IROP1






Large Size All All
Uncer 2.21*** 0.98*** 1.23*** 1.36*** 0.73 1.11*** 0.45*** 0.074*** 0.11***
(7.10) (5.51) (4.16) (3.27) (0.95) (5.43) (4.04) (4.03) (2.78)
Underwriter 0.027 0.038** 0.011 0.047 0.10 0.066** 0.0065 0.032** 0.0052
(0.68) (2.19) (0.36) (0.75) (1.53) (2.52) (0.47) (1.98) (0.18)
PEcontrol 0.62*** 0.50*** 0.13** 0.35*** 0.080 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.30***
(9.93) (17.69) (2.54) (4.13) (0.57) (3.28) (2.92) (5.43) (3.50)
Sent 0.35*** 0.042 0.39*** 0.13 0.35* 0.088** 0.025 0.079*** 0.28***
(4.73) (1.38) (6.71) (1.21) (1.97) (2.22) (0.86) (2.85) (4.93)
Topone 0.032 0.047 0.014 0.14 0.072 0.062 0.0084 0.028 0.0029
(0.26) (0.81) (0.14) (0.76) (0.29) (0.65) (0.19) (0.53) (0.03)
EPS 0.11** 0.094*** 0.21*** 0.034 0.12 0.11* 0.057*** 0.078*** 0.16***
(2.22) (3.02) (4.41) (0.41) (1.56) (1.86) (2.64) (2.82) (3.35)
Age 0.085*** 0.016 0.069*** 0.00071 0.036 0.025 0.0028 0.017* 0.026
(3.30) (1.53) (3.08) (0.02) (0.70) (1.45) (0.30) (1.72) (1.21)
Size 0.27*** 0.060*** 0.21*** 0.11* 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.014 0.051*** 0.23***
(8.05) (3.73) (7.76) (1.69) (5.12) (3.21) (1.09) (3.26) (9.09)
Sent  Uncer 0.078 0.23**
(1.41) (2.24)
_cons 3.62*** 0.66*** 2.96*** 1.55* 4.38*** 1.24** 0.041 0.77*** 3.39***
(8.41) (3.23) (8.25) (1.91) (5.59) (2.53) (0.24) (3.97) (10.32)
I.Board Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
I.Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
I.Indu Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.492 0.529 0.344 0.356 0.238 0.578 0.560 0.592 0.446
N 948 948 948 168 168 474 474 948 948
Notes: IR, IRUP and IROP (the dependent variables) are proxies for IPO initial returns, IPO underpricing and IPO overvaluation,
respectively. Uncer, Underwriter, PEcontrol and Sent are proxies for value uncertainty of IPOs, underwriter reputation, whether IPO
pricing is regulated and investor sentiment. The variables are deﬁned in Table 4. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity
consistent t-statistics.
* P < 0.1.
** P < 0.05.
*** P < 0.01.
S. Song et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 31–49 47umns 8 and 9 show that the coeﬃcient of Uncer  Sent in Columns 9 is signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that
the higher the value uncertainty of IPOs, the larger the eﬀect of investor sentiment on overvaluation.
Overall, the results in this subsection are consistent with our theoretical analysis, indicating that distin-
guishing between underpricing and overvaluation is vital when investigating their determinants.
5.4. Robustness tests
To check the robustness of our results, we conducted a series of sensitivity analyses related to aspects of
sample selection, model construction and variable measurement. Due to space limitations, the results of these
tests are not reported but are available on request.
5.4.1. Sensitivity analysis on sample selection
(1) During the sample period, there was an important reform in IPO pricing. The CSRC deregulated IPO
pricing in June 2009. As a robustness check, we divided the full sample into two sub-samples before and
after this reform and then repeat our regressions. The results show that the main conclusions from the
full sample apply to these sub-samples.
(2) According to the deﬁnitions of IPO underpricing and overvaluation, underpricing and overvaluation
should, in general, be positive. Therefore, we exclude observations with negative underpricing or nega-
tive overvaluation (346 observations) and repeat our analysis. The results from this reduced sample do
not change our main conclusions.
(3) Firm characteristics may diﬀer between listing boards, so we divide the sample into two sub-samples:
main boards and other boards (SMEs board and GEM board) and repeat our results. Again, the main
conclusions from the full sample apply to these sub-samples.
5.4.2. Sensitivity analysis on model construction and variable measurement
(1) We measure IPO ﬁrms’ intrinsic values by using analyst forecasts and comparison to similar ﬁrms. To
reduce the optimistic bias of analyst forecasts, we used the median and minimum instead of the mean of
analyst forecast prices to measure intrinsic value and repeat our analysis. We also use all of the ﬁrm’s
industry peers as comparable ﬁrms rather than selecting a comparable ﬁrm to measure intrinsic value
and repeat our analysis. We also use the rank of underwriter size (by total asset) instead of underwriter
income to measure underwriter reputation and repeat our analysis. Overall, the results show that these
changes in variable measurement do not aﬀect our main results.
(2) In the analysis in Table 8, we include the variables IRUP1 and IROP1, and IRUP2 and IROP2 into the
regression model at the same time. As a sensitivity test, we add IRUP1, IROP1, IRUP2 and IROP2, one
by one into the model. The results show that, although the size and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient of
IRUP2 decrease somewhat, the main conclusions of our analysis remain the same.
6. Conclusions and implications
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, average IPO initial returns are 66%, with underpric-
ing and overvaluation between 14–22% and 44–53%, respectively, depending on the measure used. Second,
while both the initial return and overvaluation are signiﬁcantly and negatively related to post-IPO long-run
stock performance, overvaluation predicts post-IPO performance better than the initial return. Third, the
value uncertainty of IPOs is positively related to both underpricing and overvaluation. Both underwriter rep-
utation and pricing regulation are positively related to underpricing. Investor sentiment has a positive eﬀect on
overvaluation but has no eﬀect or a negative eﬀect on underpricing. Overall, our results suggest that the main
reason for extremely high IPO initial returns in China is that ﬁrst-day closing prices are overvalued, and that
underpricing and overvaluation have diﬀerent determinants.
48 S. Song et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 31–49Our ﬁndings have important implications for both academics and regulators. First, as we have shown that
overvaluation is more important than underpricing, future studies should pay more attention to the causes of
overvaluation and to measures to control overvaluation in IPOs. When deciding the path of IPO reform, reg-
ulators should consider not only how to reduce underpricing and increase pricing eﬃciency in the primary
market, but also how to reduce overvaluation in the secondary market. Second, as we show that separating
underpricing and overvaluation from the initial return is necessary, future studies could use the methods
described here to measure underpricing and overvaluation, and then investigate their determinants more pre-
cisely and explore the potential eﬀects of IPO reform more comprehensively. Finally, our results also serve as a
reminder for scholars that using IPO initial returns to measure IPO underpricing in China is likely to be
inaccurate.
This study is subject to some limitations. The most important is that the intrinsic value of IPO ﬁrms is hard
to measure. Although the methods used here have some advantages, bias remains. We expect that improved
measures could be put forward to evaluate more precisely the relative importance of IPO underpricing and
overvaluation, investigate their determinants more accurately, and evaluate the consequences of IPO pricing
reform more eﬃciently.
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